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ABSTRACT. A study of myth, cult, and language as tools of state power, this paper
analyzes ways national identity was constructed and articulated in one state. When
Türkmenistan became independent in 1991 its first president, Saparmyrat Nyýazow,
promoted himself as the ‘savior’ of the nation by reconceptualising what it meant to be
Türkmen. Myth, public texts and language policy were used to construct this identity.
While they were the targets of the state’s cultural products, Türkmen citizens contrib-
uted to the processes of cultural production. Nyýazow legitimised his authoritarian
leadership, first by co-opting Türkmen citizens to support his regime, and then by
coercing them as participants in his personality cult. The paper concludes that
Nyýazow used the production of culture, ‘invented tradition’ in Hobsbawm’s sense, to
bolster his agenda and further his own power. It also argues that the exaggerated cult
of personality Nyýazow cultivated limited his achievements, rather than solidifying
them.
KEYWORDS: agency, cult of personality, invented tradition, myth, national
identity
The construction of post-Soviet national identity in Turkmenistan had much
to do with totalitarianism, control, and power. It involved the calculated
elevation, in everyday life, of discourse and symbols amenable to those in
authority. When Turkmenistan became independent in 1991 it was, as
Metternich once said of Italy, a ‘geographical expression’ (Sandeman 2007:
116).1 The people had no common story of a fight for independence from
Moscow; no common enemy; no shared story of clandestine nation-building as
a counterpoise to Soviet rule. The Communist Party leader at this time,
Saparmyrat Nyýazow, recognised that securing his own position would
require some kind of ideological glue to replace that afforded by Soviet power.
He accomplished this by promoting an ethno-linguistic nationalism combined
with official texts and a personality cult in which he became the embodiment
of the nation’s distinctive character and achievements. This paper explores the
ways in which Nyýazow articulated a new national identity to achieve his
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goals. In the process it will shed light on what Eric Hobsbawm memorably
called ‘the invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm 1996).
Personality cult
Power did not change hands with the onset of Turkmenistan’s
independence in 1991. Nyýazow and a small circle continued in the
leadership, concentrating power until he was the sole authority in the
country. In 1993, he adopted the appellation ‘Türkmenbas¸y’2 (Leader of all
Türkmen) and from 1999 until his death in 2006 he took the title ‘President
for Life’, combining national myth with one of himself as the nation’s
‘savior’ (Tulard 1984: 350). He declared, ‘The Türkmen need a centre of
attraction that will hold them united in material and spiritual terms in the
new age. It is only the state and its national principles that will meet this
need’ (Nyýazow 2002: 401). With such statements Nyýazow asserted that
only the state with himself at the helm could guide the Turkmen on their
new path, uniting Turkmen national identity with what became a personality
cult.
E.A. Rees’s definition of a personality cult is aptly descriptive of Turkmeni-
stan’s situation under Nyýazow:
an established system of veneration of a political leader, to which all members of the
society are expected to subscribe, a system that is omnipresent and ubiquitous and one
that is expected to persist indefinitely. It is thus a deliberately constructed and managed
mechanism, which aims at the integration of the political system around the leader’s
personality (Rees 2004: 4).
Jan Plamper also writes about the history of personality cults in a manner that
applies to Nyýazow’s case, describing modern personality cults as ‘derived
from mass politics, [employing] a mass media highly dependent on culture,
[taking] place in virtually closed societies and where the male leader served as
a metaphor for a homogenised society’ (Plamper 2012: 4).
Turkmenistan was a semi-closed society in which all members were
expected to venerate Nyýazow as Türkmenbas¸y. Nyýazow was head
of the Democratic Party – the only political party allowed in the country.
Photos of him hung in every office and on billboards throughout the
country. Accolades to him appeared in the introduction of the select
few books published and in the songs and poems children intoned on tele-
vision. The new national pledge of allegiance was as much an oath to
Nyýazow as it was to the country. He was at the centre of public life. Being
at the centre, however, did not ensure the kind of pervasive control he
desired, and to which he had become accustomed under the Soviets. For
that, additional tools would be required. Ultimately his efforts would
give him a level of control that surpassed what he enjoyed during Soviet
times.
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Invented tradition
Nyýazow’s power may have been inherited, but the country he sought to lead
was new, a circumstance that actually afforded considerable freedom in the
deployment of nationalising rhetoric and mythology as a means of legitimising
his position. Ernest Gellner has proposed that nationalism is the ‘consequence
of a new form of social organisation . . . [using] some of the pre-existent
cultures generally transforming them in the process . . .’ (Gellner 2006: 46).
Nyýazow agreed. For him ‘[T]he nation is the unity of language, religion,
customs, and tradition, ideals and state . . . The fundamental feature of our
state is its being a nation-state’(Nyýazow 2002: 254). Furthermore, ‘The state
is the essence of the national spirit . . . By means of a nation-state the values
belonging to a nation are integrated’ (Nyýazow 2002: 264). Nyýazow sought
to effect the transformation that Gellner has described first of all by portraying
himself as Türkmenistan’s redeemer. There was, however, nothing in the cou-
ntry’s actual historical experience on which to base this portrayal.
Post-Soviet discourse in Türkmenistan was an official discourse, and post-
Soviet identity was an official identity, to which ‘nationality’ was assigned by
the authorities. The phrase ‘Halk! Watan! Türkmenbas¸y!’ (People! Nation!
Türkmenbas¸y!) recited daily and found on abundant signage, characterised
Nyýazow’s vision of himself not simply as the leader of nation, but as co-equal
with it. These words became a trope for the new miras (heritage) – the ‘Golden
Age,’ as Nyýazow labelled it – the new era on which the nation was supposed
to be embarking. They also became the punch-line of jokes traded among the
citizenry, a perhaps inevitable fate for words hanging from official banners
strung across the main street of every town. The problem for Nyýazow was to
connect these slogans to some aspect of real public experience, above all that
of the millions of rural families who thought little about the abstractions of
national independence, but a great deal about the practicalities of keeping
their children fed after years of shortages, heightened at the end by the addi-
tional uncertainly that accompanied Perestoika. The new official discourse,
new social practices, new symbols, and new public rituals all supported the
myth of an ethnically homogenous nation-state.
Türkmenistan is, in fact, more ethnically homogenous than most countries.
According to the most recent available census data (1995), ethnic Turkmen
constituted 77 percent of the population. Minority ethnic populations
included Uzbeks (9.2 percent), Russians (6.7 percent), and Kazakhs (2
percent). Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Tatars, Baluch and Jews made up
the remaining 5.1 percent (Patheos online).3 Their assimilation was not an
overt goal of state policy. However, it was implicit through a reassertion of the
national identity along linguistic lines, to which ethnic identity became logi-
cally subordinate. Ethnic Türkmen were also affected. New policies were
designed such that a ‘true’ Türkmen was not a person claiming membership
through bloodline – as was customary – but through knowledge of the
Türkmen language.4 Ethnic Türkmen who did not know Türkmen would soon
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see themselves as disenfranchised as the non-Türkmen of the country, most of
whom would find that the new linguistic nationalism was exclusionary in its
effects, however inclusionary its rhetoric.
Old bottles were rapidly filled with the new wine. On national holidays, for
instance, school children and teachers were required to recite poetry and
perform ‘traditional’ songs and dances and other rituals in stadiums around
the country. All were performed in Türkmen, and while the forms may
(ostensibly) have been traditional, the words were new, written to praise the
post-Soviet leadership of Ilkinji we Ömürlik Prezidenti Türkmenbas¸y (First
President for Life Türkmenbas¸y). These rituals represented the type of
‘invented tradition’ to which Eric Hobsbawm refers: ‘existing customary tra-
ditional practices – folksong . . . modified, ritualised and institutionalized for
the new national purposes’ (Hobsbawm 1996: 6). The top-down artificiality of
those purposes was, of course, apparent to those involved. If a student chose
not to participate a teacher would call their parents, or a parent’s boss, to scold
them. This was a carryover from the Soviet system, in which celebration of
holidays was mandatory. In post-Soviet Türkmenistan, holidays became so
frequent that they elicited complaints from students, teachers, and parents in
private conversations. Teachers and students would stand lined up along a
road or in a stadium for three to four hours in advance of television coverage
to prepare for an event. Among themselves, teachers complained that practices
for such activities were so frequent that they interfered with learning. Still,
Nyýazow encouraged people,
Our souls become one in various festivals and commemoration days attended by all the
public in every corner of our nation to remember past sorrows and anniversaries. These
events contribute to the spiritual strength of our people. They make people closer to
one another. The festivals help us erase these difficulties from our minds . . . Each
Türkmen should enthusiastically celebrate our festivals in the way our ancestors did
(Türkmenbas¸y 2002: 381–2).
But even such exhortations were specifically aimed at Türkmen and not the
rest of the ethnic groups. They were excluded from the rhetoric and from the
idea of being Türkmen.
The national revival movement
Türkmenistanynˇ Umumymilli Galkynys¸ hereketi (Turkmenistan’s National
Revival Movement) was As¸gabat’s official program for building a secular state
based on a Türkmen identity and Muslim culture. National Revival began 17
January 1994 at the convocation of the fifth assembly of the Halk Maslahaty
(People’s Council), which was (until 2008) the highest representative body in
Türkmenistan. Revival of the national culture ranged from broad programs
reintegrating Islam into daily life, after decades of official atheism; to paying
closer attention to national customs (däp dessurleri); to the establishment of
the Democratic Party in place of the Communist one. Politically, the aim was
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to promote the concept of Independent, Neutral Türkmenistan’ an interna-
tional position that was portrayed as consistent with, and derivative of, the
nation’s unique cultural identity (Kiepenheuer-Drechsler, 2006).
The discourses of National Revival were embodied in the phrase ‘Altyn
Asyr’ or Golden Century. The Golden Century was the metonym for all that
was good about post-Soviet Türkmenistan. It appeared in the names of
shopping centres and hotels, in descriptors of products like bottled water
and yogurt, and was promoted as the nickname for the generation that never
knew Soviet life – Altyn Asyr Nesli (The Golden Generation). That genera-
tion would participate in Türkmen nationalism by marching in parades,
celebrating new holidays learning new school curricular, reading new books,
reciting ancient as well as new poetry, learning traditional as well as new
songs, memorising new catechisms and homilies, visiting new shrines, and in
identifying Nyýazow as Beýik Serdar Türkmenbas¸y (Great Leader of all the
Turkmen).
None of the symbols and semantics of National Revival were more intense
than those surrounding the president. Photos of Nyýazow hung over every
official doorway, in classrooms, and on airplanes. Statues of Nyýazow sprung
up around the country, including the famous golden figure of him atop the
Arch of Neutrality in downtown As¸gabat, which rotated to ensure that it
always faced the sun. Nyýazow’s image appeared on the new currency, on the
gold plated lapel pins worn by public officials, and on the front page of every
newspaper, every day. Nyýazow changed the name of the city Krasnovodsk to
Türkmenbas¸y while Çärjew became Türkmenabat (city of Türkmen). The
town Gyzylarbat took the president’s second new appellation, Serdar (leader),
and the district of Ýlanly became Gurbansoltan Eje, after Nyýazow’s mother.
Even the national anthem began with his name.
Identities
Among the many identities from which Nyýazow could have chosen he built
upon a specifically anti-Russian, pro-Western, Turco-Islamic heritage, which
looked to its ancient cultural antecedents and ignored the Soviet experience,
except to denigrate it. He wrote,
We sometimes come across people today who say that we were better off during the
Soviet era. My dear Türkmen! Don’t be mistaken! . . . You almost lost your native
tongue during the Soviet era. You were not admitted to schools and you could not find
employment if you did not know Russian. You forgot about your religion, tradition
and values. You lagged economically. Our nation lived under terrible conditions
in villages and towns. It is essential that our old tell the young about this (Nyýazow
2002: 296).
Denigration of the Soviet past allowed the new government to paint the
post-Soviet period as fresh and promising. More than that, Nyýazow pro-
moted a history that emphasised ancient heritage to the point of obscuring
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modern events, in an attempt to shape a national memory from which inter-
action with Russians had been erased. There was no Great Game in the
nineteenth century, no context for the 1881 Battle at Gök Tepe, which had
solidified Russian colonisation of Türkmen lands, and a mostly studied silence
about life under Soviet rule. Still, there were moments that slipped into the
narrative when they were convenient. World War II was commemorated and
the 1948 earthquake that had destroyed much of the capital As¸gabat was not
forgotten. Each appeared in history books and was marked by a national
holiday in part because of Nyýazow’s personal connection: his father died in
the war and the rest of his family was lost in the earthquake. This recon-
structed historical narrative interwove Türkmenbas¸y’s personal history with
the reconfigured history of the People and Nation, again underscoring the
symmetry between Halk, Watan and Türkmenbas¸y.
This approach also had the political advantage of allowing Nyýazow to
present himself to his own people as anti-Russian without actually having to
do or say anything against Russia. He could easily have chosen a more
expressly anti-Russian cultural line, emphasising Russian colonial history
and encroachment on Türkmen lands. Instead, fine lines were drawn.
Nyýazow contemplated building a museum to honor the fallen at Gök Tepe,
for instance, but by the time he began coordinating with an architect and
looking at serious proposals he was too concerned with Russian sensitivities
to go through with the plan (Conversations with Turkish architects, 2001–
2004). Although domestic politics were still very much geared toward
Türkmenification and the cult of Nyýazow, national trade agreements
with Russia were important enough that Nyýazow did not want to risk
insulting his northern business partner by bringing up bitter memories. Thus
Gök Tepe would be commemorated in humanitarian and religious, but
not political terms: there is a large mosque at Gök Tepe, but no new
museum.5
Public texts & script
Language and script were crucial to the discourse of National Revival. Alter-
ing a people’s script is a common method for disassociating or re-associating
them with some aspect of their identity. In 1928, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
replaced Turkey’s Arabic script with a modern Latin-based alphabet to sym-
bolically westernise Turkish society. The history of language politics in
Türkmenistan is not unique in the sociolinguistic path it took, but it is an
important aspect of how the official Türkmen national identity came to be
formed (Clement 2007: 266–80).
In 1993, Nyýazow took control of public texts, announcing that the country
would adopt a Latin-based ‘Turkmen National Alphabet’ in place of the
Cyrillic one the Turkmen had used since 1940. He explained in speeches and in
the press that
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creating a new Turkmen alphabet based on the Latin script would hasten the young
country’s progress toward intellectual, cultural and social strength. And, it would
expedite means for Turkmenistan’s joining the world civilization and taking its own
worthy place among developed countries (Türkmenbas¸y 1994: 33–4).
There was a state-driven program employing newspapers and journals, radio
and television to announce details about the new alphabet, which first
appeared in newspaper mastheads and in television spots, broadening slowly
out from there. Schools began with first grades and each subsequent year
expanded their focus to include upcoming classes, keeping pace between class-
room instruction, teacher training, and development of new textbooks (Inter-
view with Myratgeldi Söýegow, member of the Alphabet Commission, 2001).
Government offices and official media were the final targets for reform. The
first newspaper printed entirely in the new Latin alphabet appeared in Gün on
27 October 1994, the third anniversary of Turkmenistan’s declaration of inde-
pendence (Clement 2008: 181).
The new alphabet symbolised Türkmenification. In abandoning the Cyrillic
script of the Soviet era, As¸gabat signalled an anti-Russian cultural stance that
was also moving swiftly throughout other parts of the former Soviet Union.
Turks in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and even the Tatars in Russia, were
discussing adoption of a Latin-based alphabet. The new alphabets law
reflected the state’s view of the Latin-based script as possessing international
currency. Moreover, in 1993, As¸gabat passed a Three Language Policy,
making English the second official language of the country and Russian the
third. With respect to this policy Nyýazow wrote, ‘just as the Cyrillic alphabet
had aided in Turkmens’ learning Russian, the new [Latin] alphabet will assist
the populace in its learning English’ (Türkmenbas¸y 1994: 33–4). Latinisation
aimed to facilitate the emergence of a new and implicitly anti-Soviet intellec-
tual order.
Language status and identity
Language was crucial to the way Nyýazow reconceptualised life in
Türkmenistan. Thus he announced,
The national language is an essential quality of our state and society. We have been
using our Türkmen language as our official language. Otherwise, our essential quality,
nationality, would not be able to penetrate into the meaning of our state and its
properties (Türkmenbas¸y, 2002, p. 400).
During the Soviet era, Russian language held a higher status than Türkmen
language and Russian speakers held positions of authority. Türkmen only
became the official language of the Türkmen Soviet Socialist Republic in 1990
on the eve of the Soviet collapse, and the subsequent displacement of Russian
for official and public purposes took time. Language status became a
major focus in the mid-1990s when the state began replacing Russian vocabu-
lary with Türkmen terms, and sponsoring programs to reinvigorate the
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ancient vocabulary. In 1998, the Türkmen state blocked Russian television
broadcasting provided by ORT television. Only one Russian language news-
paper survived (one produced by the government itself), along with twenty-
two published in Türkmen. The state was limiting access to non-Turkmen
forms of information and language to promote Turkmen.
By 2000, language planners were systematically inventing neologisms to
create a comprehensive Türkmen vocabulary. A section in the Türkmen Lan-
guage and Literature Institute was devoted to language development and the
state founded the newspaper Türkmen Dili as a forum for intellectuals to
explain new terms and their historical roots to readers. All of this work led to
the need for a dictionary to explain the post-Soviet terms to the populace
(Beýik Saparmurat Türkmenbashy Zamanasynynˇ Sözlügi 2002). President
Nyýazow himself made the language question into a national priority, by
declaring in 2000 that he wanted to see ‘the complete and universal introduc-
tion’ of the national language in public life (Paul Goble 2000). He underscored
his seriousness in televised broadcasts in which he would criticise officials who
spoke Russian better than they did the national tongue. He even fired his
foreign minister specifically for the latter’s weak knowledge of Turkmen. In
2002, the government banned the importation of foreign texts, restricted cable
television and blocked the popular Russian language radio station Radio
Mayak (RFE/RL 2004). As Turkmen gained in status the Russian language’s
status fell. The official ideology did not define ‘Turkmen’ simply by ethnicity,
lineage or ancestry – although these were not ignored – but first and foremost
by language, which was presented as the reification of other elements of
national identity.6 It was not enough to be Turkmen by blood and ancestry,
one also needed to speak the language. Nyýazow began speaking Turkmen
in public and surrounded himself – in public – with Turkmen language
speakers.
Anyone who had advanced socially or economically during the Soviet years
by virtue of membership in the Russian-speaking elite was denied status and
state positions under Nyýazow. (Members of Nyýazow’s own inner circle, all
of whom, like Türkmenbas¸y himself, were old Soviets who continued to speak
Russian behind closed doors, were exceptions). Linguistic discrimination,
which implied that post-Soviet Türkmenistan had only enough space for ‘real’
Türkmen (Türkmenbas¸y 2002: 365), led to the emigration of ethnic minorities.
Russian speakers left Türkmenistan if they could (Uzzell 2000).7
Most people who did not speak Turkmen lost their jobs with the state – the
number one employer.8 Turkmen language speakers took their places, regard-
less of merit or skill. The state organised Turkmen language classes under the
direction of the various Ministries (Education, Communications, Foreign
Affairs, etc.) for the employees within each sector. Still, most non-Turkmen
did not learn the Turkmen language. Russian speakers reported that these
classes were either not announced, were never actually carried out or, they
admitted, they simply had not wanted to attend (Fieldwork observations,
2001–2006).
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Some ethnic Türkmen, though not all, saw the linguistic dispossession of
non-Türkmen minorities as justice for decades of ‘oppression.’ For them
political independence and cultural exclusivity went hand and hand. Turkmen
who could speak the Turkmen language felt justified in becoming the new
‘elite’ (Fieldwork observations, 2001–2006). Turkmen speakers began to take
over the most prestigious jobs and positions of responsibility, while Russian-
speaking professors, scientists, doctors, and lawyers found themselves rel-
egated to working as taxi drivers.
Western reports focused on the brain drain and the official abuse of minor-
ities across the country. What these reports missed was that there had been a
base of popular support for the president’s initial cultural policies in the early
1990s. What was unacceptable to Western analysts was acceptable to a sub-
stantial number of ethnic Türkmen. Only twenty-eight percent of Türkmen
had claimed Russian as their second language in the 1989 Soviet census (Clark
et al. 1997: 317). A good deal of the population felt that they were not losing
with the Türkmenification of social structures so much as they were gaining a
country (Fieldwork observations, 2001–2006).9
As¸gabat’s rhetoric aimed to create cohesion among Türkmen, as defined
by the state, and to keep non-Türkmen out of that collective. The post-
Soviet Türkmen nationalism not only excluded non-Türkmen from the
nation, but it also kept ‘Russians’ from being a part of the elite and pros-
pering in the newly designed state.10 This arrangement upended lives leaving
thousands unemployed and just as many newly employed with no experience
at their work.
It was in these heady days that Nyýazow called out to Türkmen around the
world to return to their ‘native’ land. He invited the diaspora to ‘come home’
(Durdýew and Kadyrow 1991).11 Türkmenbas¸y saw himself as the leader of
Türkmen everywhere. He called them to immigrate and increase the country’s
numbers; over 13,000 came from Tajikistan alone.12 One Ahal Teke informant
told the story of how he and his brothers had been born and lived
in Dushanbe, Tajikistan until the 1990s, when Türkmenbas¸y called them
‘home.’ They had arrived in Türkmenistan and with the exception of one
were living very good lives. ‘Türkmenistan for Türkmen!’ his deep voice
boomed.
Ruhnama
National Revival continued to capitalise on Türkmen heritage, but as time
passed there was less focus on Türkmenification and ancient tradition, and an
increasing focus on Nyýazow personally. Adherence to a strict line of cultural
policy and celebration of Nyýazow’s Turkmenistan diluted the Turkmen
people’s role in in National Revival from vital supporters to miserably coerced
participants. 2001–2002 began to see a decline in popular support as people
began to feel that Nyýazowisation was overshadowing Türkmenification. The
President’s book, Ruhnama, played a significant role in this shift.
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Ruhnama was President Nyýazow’s pseudo-historical-spiritual tome, which
he wrote in order to guide the Turkmen people in their newly found independ-
ence. He explained, ‘The Ruhnama brings the national perception into a system
and organisation. I have written the Ruhnama to enable my nation to perceive
our past and to envision our own dignity.’ (Nyýazow 2002: 61). Ruhnama
offered Nyýazow’s interpretation of Türkmen history, wrapped up together
with his autobiography, stories of Türkmen ancestors and their important
deeds, and a moral code combining Türkmen and Islamic values. In the
tradition of Central Asian epics, it sacralised the leader’s family, idolising
Nyýazow’s own mother and father.13 In it he mused:
What is the meaning of the Head of State writing on philosophical matters? . . . five- or
ten-year programmes are not sufficient for the needs of our state. At this time, it is
necessary not only to establish a state but also to create a nation, for a nation needs
far-reaching moral values and criteria. We have to seek and find ways in which these
kinds of criteria can be provided through moral work and traditional moral philoso-
phies (Nyýazow 2002: 69).
He would not only run the state, but also, as Head of all the Turkmen, guide
the people toward their future. Published in December 2001, a decade after
independence, Ruhnama became a formal part of the educational curriculum
the following year. Ruhnama became the key source in humanities curricula.
State employees (including medical doctors) were required to take weekly
lessons. Television, radio, and newspapers relayed excerpts and homilies to the
people. All public speeches referenced it. It stood beside the Koran in state
funded mosques. Yet it never resonated with the broader public in the way
Nyýazow must have expected it would. Most citizens quietly went along with
the public recitations, ignoring the ubiquitous signage referencing it, and
grudgingly accepted it as part of curricula. In an obvious parallel with the
required political indoctrination in the Soviet period, protesting would have
caused more trouble for most people than it was worth.
Though Nyýazow humbly claimed that Ruhnama was ‘not a history book’
its pages asserted that it imparted the great ‘lessons of history’ (Nyýazow 2002:
44, 74), and its author persistently expressed expertise in Turkmen history.
Ruhnama became Turkmenistan’s de facto official history during Nyýazow’s
presidency, much to the consternation of historians, teachers and parents.14 In
addition to forcing Ruhnama into school curricula, Nyýazow eliminated other
available histories. Other scholarly works not approved by him personally
were either not allowed to be published or, in at least one case, burned by state
authorities and the author removed from his position at the Magtumguly
University because his history contradicted that in Ruhnama (Conversations
with historians, librarians, and scholars, 2001–2002).15 Ruhnama’s aim was to
solidify and teach the myth of Nyýazow’s Turkmenistan, which gained legiti-
macy from its link to an ancient past, however imaginary.
Nyýazow sought to instruct the people in what it meant to be a ‘true’
Turkmen: moderately Muslim, Turkmen speaking, faithful to the state, and
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loyal to Nyýazow. Ruhnama, was the keystone in the construction of his
personality cult. In this Turkmenistan was not unique. As Amieke Bouma has
observed, ‘[a]ll five Central Asian republics developed strong presidential
systems and everywhere the heads of state [were] actively involved in the
creation and propagation of the new state ideology also through the writing of
books on politics and the histories of their respective republics’ (Bouma 2011:
559). However, the scope of Turkmenistan’s use of presidential texts in
schools, for driver’s license tests, even in medical schools, was spectacularly
atypical. Nyýazow’s discourse was pervasive and invasive.
Cult of distraction16
It was with Ruhnama that Nyýazow pushed Türkmenification beyond what
even ethnic Turkmen-speakers found tolerable. Ruhnama was presented as an
‘inspired text,’ a ‘sacred book,’ the ‘lighthouse for the people.’17 As such it
moved policy beyond Türkmenification toward Nyýazowisation. Popular tol-
erance of Nyýazow’s discourse began to wane, as it invaded people’s lives,
becoming an insufferable daily hassle rather than simply a distraction.
In August 2002, Nyýazow announced that the country would be using a
new calendar. He changed the names of the months and the days of the week.18
The names of the months included ‘Independence’ for October and ‘Neutral-
ity’ for December. Others were taken from ancient Türkmen leaders, poets,
and Nyýazow’s own family. January was Türkmenbas¸y and April bore his
mother’s name. While less dramatic than the French revolutionary calendar
which not only renamed the months, but also completely reorganised the
calendar year and days of the week, most people in Türkmenistan thought this
was a wholly unnecessary step in their already complicated lives.
After 2002, the semantics of Türkmenification intensified, while shifting
away from connections to the ancient past and toward commemoration of
Nyýazow’s decisive role in the nation’s rebirth. In 2004, he built the largest
mosque in Central Asia in his father’s village, Gypçak. The state razed single-
story homes with barnyards to build luxury high-rise ‘Golden Era’ apartment
buildings; and in a public park he erected a twenty-foot tall neon Ruhnama in
As¸gabat which slowly opened and closed every thirty minutes like a Times
Square spectacle. On the outskirts of As¸gabat, in another park named Saglyk
Yolu (Health Walk) a giant statue of Nyýazow depicted in work-out garb,
including Puma sneakers, encouraged people to undertake the trek up the 37
kilometer-long, winding set of steps. Its ritualisation was enhanced by a basin
next to the statue’s foot, in which water collected. Through urban myth people
were encouraged to touch or drink from the water almost like holy water
before climbing the steps. The state built fountains and parks throughout this
area. People gathered at these as they used to at the Soviet monuments, both
to have photos taken on their wedding days and to escape the heat rising from
the streets of the city in summer. These new sites of commemoration drew the
556 Victoria Clement
© The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
nation’s capital into the narrative of Nyýazow’s Türkmenistan (Denison 2009:
1167–68; Šir 2008).
Audience reception: co-production
Nyýazow’s personality cult was inescapably a top-down phenomenon
imposed by the political equivalent of brute force. Yet it could not have
succeeded to the extent that it did if it had not awakened some kind of
reciprocal response among the Türkmen people. Yves Cohen writes of per-
sonality cults generally,
To understand the cult fully in its many forms, both material and mediated, we should
approach it as an enormous co-construction in which a wide variety of people and
groups took part . . . The producers of the cult were the politicians and professionals in
various media. And of course, there were those who received and consumed the cult
(Cohen 2007: 615).
Interpreting cult as a production, Cohen refers to its ‘producers’ and its
‘reception.’ The people of Turkmenistan were an ‘audience,’ but also ‘active
participants’ in the state system; the slogan ‘Halk! Watan! Türkmenbas¸y!’
illustrated the state’s reliance on the nation to sustain the National Revival
Movement. Michael Denison uses the term ‘performers’ to describe those who
took part in Türkmenistan’s rituals and choreographed mass spectacles
(Denison 2009: 1170). Without ignoring the element of coercion, it is apparent
that many of those who participated in the new national discourse did so
sometimes to preserve something of themselves within an oppressive structure
that they could not resist overtly. Some Turkmen found ways to use the new
cultural dispensation to their advantage – primarily to get new state jobs, or to
save old ones. Conformity was itself an act of agency. James Scott writes about
this sort of use of an official discourse to achieve one’s personal aims. He
recognises it as a form of agency where one might participate in the official
discourse just to survive within a restrictive system or to manipulate the system
to one’s own aims (Scott 1990). Cohen agrees, writing, ‘if the cult can . . . be
understood as a way of giving form to people’s relationship[s] with power, the
practices of the cult, too, were aimed at gaining power’s favor . . .’ (Cohen
2007: 616). At times it seemed as if there was a mere monologue emanating
from the office of the President, but that cannot have been the case. The
participation of the ordinary Türkmen meant there was an exchange taking
place, even in ideological spaces dominated by the state and its interests.
In the 1990s, in light of civil war and ethnic strife in Tajikistan and Uzbeki-
stan, many Türkmen saw a strong centralised leadership as the best guarantor
of peace. This contributed to their acceptance of Nyýazow as the country’s
saviour. After 11 September 2001, the government played up the (unlikely)
threat of terrorism and Islamic extremism, while the people also worried about
the (even more unlikely) threat of Türkmen tribal conflict. The idea of a
strong, solitary leader did not conflict with the Türkmen value system, which
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resembles the Russian tradition of reverence for the ‘benevolent tsar’
(batiushka-tsar – the little father). In Russian and Türkmen history alike, the
pervasiveness of such values is part of the explanation for state excesses
(Plamper 2012: 9). Many Türkmen did not blame Nyýazow for his own
personality cult, citing zealous supporters or sycophants as the guilty parties.
Nor was Nyýazow alone faulted for administrative excesses like the bugging of
phones, or social deficiencies such as rampant bribery. Citizens told me, ‘if he
knew about it, it wouldn’t be happening’ (Fieldwork observations, 2001–
2002). Turkmen knew that Nyýazow was ultimately in charge. But, they also
rationalised that he could not control every detail in daily life, and thus cited
self-interested elements within the administration as the source of
Türkmenistan’s social problems (Fieldwork observations, 2001–2002). The
element of psychological defensiveness that is apparent in such an outlook is
part of how personality cults work. They succeed as cults because they are able
to claim loyalty and credit, while evading responsibility.
In fact, Nyýazow deliberately kept his administrators and state institutions
weak by allowing individuals to hold their posts for only short periods of time.
It was not unusual to turn on the evening news and see the president calling
ministers to task in a televised meeting. He would berate them for corruption,
disloyalty, thievery, or incompetence and then force them to beg for forgive-
ness, before firing them and sending them off to jail or demoting them to a
menial job. Many were indeed guilty of corruption since they knew they would
only be in office for a short period of time, and hoped to make the most of it.
If Nyýazow had allowed individuals to stay in office long enough to gain some
professional knowledge and build some political capital, his people may have
become effective administrators; but then his own cult-like role would have
been diminished. Nyýazow’s pose as the people’s protector against corruption
and incompetence required a continuous supply of both; his regime was cal-
culated to produce them.
Nyýazow ‘led’ the public by making them feel as if they were constantly
under siege. He constantly reminded people of the threat of civil war or
instability, encouraging Turkmen to accept his protection as the only safe path
forward. Nyýazow encouraged fear of threats from beyond the national
borders if the people did not accept his protection, and from within if anyone
stood against him. He even made the northern-most province, Das¸oguz, a
restricted region, accessible only with internal visas, based on a fear of the
large Uzbek population that lived there, near the border with Uzbekistan. In
Article 54 of the Constitution, the president – Nyýazow – himself was consid-
ered the ‘chief guarantor of national independence, territorial integrity.’ He
used symbolism and rhetoric to construct the new Türkmen national identity,
but he also induced fear to convince the populace of the need for his strong,
authoritarian leadership.
Nyýazow simultaneously curried favor with the people by addressing
certain material concerns. His ‘Ten Years of Prosperity’19 program contrived a
pact between the people of Türkmenistan and himself through which the state,
558 Victoria Clement
© The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
with its access to rich hydrocarbon reserves, provided subsidies to all citizens
while they kept silent about their lack of liberties.20 In banners all around the
country and as part of the Prosperity plan, Nyýazow proclaimed that within
ten years Türkmenistan would be the ‘Second Kuwait.’ He even went so far as
to promise – not just Herbert Hoover’s ‘chicken in every pot and a car in every
garage’ – but a Mercedes in every garage. According to this arrangement, of
which the government constantly reminded the people via slogans, banners,
and daily newspaper articles, the state secured the right to rule without checks
or balances such as a free press, an independent legal system or civilian
oversight of military institutions. Moreover, Nyýazow held complete control
of the country’s finances. In fact, he not only represented the country as head
of government, chairman of the party and leader of the military, but he also
personified the state. In exchange, citizens received for free or at a minimal
cost: water, natural gas, gasoline, electricity, flour, salt, cooking oil, the pro-
tection of the Türkmen state, ‘peace and tranquility’ (Nyýazow 2002: 287), and
the paternalistic guidance of Türkmenbas¸y. For the many citizens who had
suffered a complete lack of liberties this was an arrangement they endured due
to fear of civil war, violence from abroad or repression at home. Nyýazow
combined this mechanism with coercion, myth and discourse to articulate the
post-Soviet Türkmen nation identity and attempt to buttress his own power.
Conclusion
Türkmenistan’s first president created an ethno-linguistic nationalism to
solidify and legitimise his rule. This nationalism marginalised citizens who did
not speak Türkmen from access to social power and even employment. Ques-
tions of identity and the discourse of nation building are accordingly of more
than theoretical interest. They go to the heart of how society, the economy,
and ordinary people’s lives were organised in the first twenty years after
the end of the USSR. In this respect Turkmenistan is exemplary, but not
unique.
In Nyýazow’s creations, including his book, Ruhnama, his invention of a
distinctive calendar, the erection of monuments (including several to himself),
and reforms to the script and language, we can trace the mechanisms he used
to support his discourse of ‘National Revival.’ We can also see the ways that
discourse went beyond rhetoric to shape the lives of the Türkmen people. Of
all the symbols and markers of the new national identity none was as mean-
ingful as language, the cultural realm in which the power of the new state could
be exercised most freely. It was language above all that made culture a weapon
in the hands of the state.
In Nyýazow’s Türkmenistan the citizenry contributed to the processes of
cultural production even while they were the targets of the state’s cultural
products (Plamper 2012: 205). A study of the importance of myth, cult, and
language as tools of state power, this paper analyzes the ways national identity
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was constructed and articulated in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. It explores the
methods through which Nyýazow legitimised his authoritarian leadership, first
to coop Türkmen citizens to support his regime, and then to coerce them as
participants in his personality cult. It concludes that Nyýazow used the pro-
duction of culture, of ‘invented tradition’ in Hobsbawm’s sense, to bolster his
agenda and further his own power.
It also argues that the exaggerated cult of personality that Nyýazow culti-
vated limited his achievements, rather than solidifying them. The symbiotic
relationship signalled in the phrase ‘Halk! Watan! Turkmenbas¸y!’ was gradu-
ally eroded by cultural policies that became so intrusive, so implausible, and so
entangled in the practicalities of daily life, that the average Türkmen could not
help but recognise the gradual transformation of his own cultural role, from
that of ‘co-producer’ and willing audience member to that of reluctant,
coerced consumer. After Ruhnama entered schools in the early 2000s Altyn
Asyr began to see a decline in popular support, as even the ‘true’ Türkmen
grew alienated from the regime, sensing that Nyýazowisation was overshad-
owing Türkmenification.
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Notes
1 The territory that became Turkmenistan in 1991 was demarcated by the Soviets in 1924 as the
Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. It corresponded closely to the tsarist province of Transcaspia.
2 This name was no doubt fashioned after Atatürk which means ‘father of the Turks,’ taken by
Mustafa Kemal as he was forging the Turkish Republic out of the Ottoman state, but Nyýazow
was probably also influenced by the other leaders such as Karimov in Uzbekistan and Nazarbayev
in Kazakhstan. There are also similarities between the Nyýazow and Reza Shah of Iran, including
the use of the title ‘Serdar.’ Ansari, 2003 describes the centrality of the ruler as ‘dynastic nation-
alism’ p. 59–71.
3 In 2003 the CIA reported the demographic breakdown as Turkmen eighty-five per cent, Uzbek
five per cent, Russian four per cent, other six per cent https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html. Accessed on 17 March 2013].
4 Edgar, 2004, explores the role of genealogy in the history of Turkmen identity. Privatsky,
2001, goes into rich detail about how Kazakhs similarly define a ‘true Kazakh’; Ansari, 2003,
p. 45, discusses Reza Shah exercises in social engineering designed to encourage the concept of a
‘pure Persian’.
5 The small museum that is there was built by the Soviets.
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6 In order to gain entrance to a university, students had to fill out applications requiring them
to identify their ancestors going back three generations. This was an ancient way of proving one’s
identity via lineage as well as to demonstrate pride in heritage.
7 According to official figures found in Uzzell, 2000, the share of ethnic Russians in the popu-
lation (primarily urban) dropped from fifteen per cent in 1991 to two per cent in 1999.
8 Unemployment is nearly impossible to estimate. In 1997 Clark et al. estimated rural unem-
ployment to be as high as 60 per cent; in 2009 TACIS estimated it to be closer to 30 per cent,
though I believe TACIS was underestimating.
9 Punctuating the language issue was the change in alphabet that had been instituted in 1996. It
deliberately distanced the people from Russian, and oriented the country toward Turkey and the
West. Most importantly, it was another symbolic break with the Soviet past.
10 This included ethnic Russians, Armenians, Ukrainians, Azerbaijanis, Poles, Jews; essentially
anyone who was not Turkmen ethnically and those Turkmen who could not speak the Turkmen
language.
11 Türkmen reside in Afghanistan (one million), Iran (two million), and China
(one-hundred thousand). There are also Türkmen in the other Central Asian countries as well as
Iraq.
12 ‘Over 10,000 Tajik refugees to become citizens in Turkmenistan,’ UNHCR, August 10, 2005,
http://www.unhcr.org/42fa23954.html (accessed April 8, 2012).
13 Not unlike a form of ancestor worship, with flowers being lain at monuments to each parent
on holidays, manifestations of this secular religion (in parallel with Islam) inherently supported
worship of Nyýazow himself.
14 Parents were outraged by the vacuous content of the book, but also annoyed by the fact that
each student had to purchase their own two-dollar copy rather than be assigned a book from
school as was usual practice with books. Conversations, 2001–2012.
15 Türkmenbas¸y, 2002: 9, 66–7, 77, 293, claimed, despite all evidence to the contrary, that
Türkmen have lived in the land today called Türkmenistan for 5,000 years. For example, he
claimed that Türkmen lived in the city of Merw 4,000 years ago. The scholar whose books were
destroyed and lost his position wrote, in accord with other respected histories that Türkmen tribes
migrated westward from lands close to the Chinese border less than 2,000 years ago.
16 Reference to a ‘cult of distraction’ is inspired by Kracauer (1987).
17 Signs with these phrases, ‘Mukaddes Ruhnama’ (Holy/Sacred Ruhnama) and ‘Halkynˇ
S¸amçyragy’ (Lighthouse for the People) and others, such as ‘The President’s path is our path,’
were seen around the nation and most especially in the areas in and around As¸gabat.
18 Sunday-Saturday: Old system – Ýeks¸enbe, Dus¸enbe, Sis¸enbe, Çars¸enbe, Pens¸enbe, Anna,
S¸enbe; New System (Sunday–Saturday) – Dynçgün (Day of Rest), Bas¸gün (Firstday), Ýas¸gün
(Youthday), Sogapgün (Blessingday), Annagün (Muslim day of rest), Ruhgün (Day of the Soul).
19 This program was later changed to ‘Ten Years of Stability’.
20 While there were public protests their numbers were small and opposition in-exile remained
disunited.
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